Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies by Jones Clive Petersen Tore T. & Tore T. Petersen

Author:Jones, Clive, Petersen, Tore T. & Tore T. Petersen
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 2013-07-07T16:00:00+00:00

Israel’s Clandestine Diplomatic Contacts with Independent Sudan: 1954–8

The objection of the Umma Party, the leading force in Sudan’s political system in the mid-1950s, to Egypt’s demanding aspirations for establishing a unity framework with Sudan, known as the ‘Unity of the Nile Valley’,7 and for achieving a greater political and economic foothold in Khartoum, spurred Sudan’s first pro-Western coalition governments into remaining ideologically and politically aloof from Cairo and from the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Egyptian fear was shared by Israel and Sudan, who observed the growing Soviet influence in Cairo and the growing Egyptian drive for Arab unity under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s leadership.

In the fall of 1956, one unnamed Sudanese official affiliated with the governing Umma Party stated in clear terms that ‘Sudan perceives the Egyptian military empowerment [as] a direct danger for its independence, fearing that Egypt will attack Sudan rather than attacking Israel.’ He continued that the government in Khartoum ‘[H]as an interest to weaken the regime in Egypt and tighten cooperation with Nasser’s opponents.’ Yet the Sudanese official remained circumspect over ties with Israel, emphasising that concurrent factors, primarily ‘Sudan’s dependence on the Suez Canal, the [Nile] allocation water problem [between the two countries and Sudan’s distressing] financial difficulties’, obliged the Khartoum government ‘to be nice to Egypt’.8 Being acquainted with Sudan’s politics, the Israeli official, who reported this Sudanese message from Addis Ababa,9 evaluated the ability of Khartoum’s government to block the Egyptian endeavour to gain an influential foothold in Sudan as one yielding ‘encouraging prospects’. The Israeli official noted, however, that the success of the Sudanese endeavour to fend off Egypt’s pressure ‘[D]epends on the extent of [foreign] political and economic aid’ which Khartoum will get. The Israeli official implied that Israel alone cannot meet this challenge, and that it should establish triangular cooperation with France,10 an idea, he further argued, which was acceptable to the Sudanese government. The Israeli message ended with a clue on an imminent secret meeting to be held with the participation of the Sudanese representative ‘at the end of the week in Paris’ to advance this matter.11

Israel’s appeal to France was influenced by Khartoum’s repeated exertions of pressure on Jerusalem, urging it to gird up its loins and make ‘greater efforts’ to reinforce Sudan’s resilience against Egypt’s militancy. This was exemplified by the message delivered by Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil to Jerusalem in May 1956, intertwining it with a hinted threat that if the Sudanese call for greater help would not be met, Sudan might be forced to resort to moves detrimental to Israel. ‘Does Israel not understand that if Sudan would be compelled to join the Arab League,12 then Israel would pay a much higher price as Sudan might be compelled to send a military brigade to Israel’s border [with Egypt]?’13

Although the contacts, which were maintained between the representatives of Israel and Sudan’s leading Umma Party, remained mostly undisclosed by Israel, there were reports claiming that the two sides held talks in various European capital cities. In one of

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